The (un)Usual Suspects: Tracking America's Next Adversaries (2025-2045)

Framing the Future

Disclaimer: This research project uses data derived from open-source materials like public intelligence assessments, government publications, and think tank reports. This report is based solely on my personal insights, hypothetical scenarios, and independent analysis. It does not contain any sensitive or classified information and does not reflect the views of my employer. This report's purpose is to serve as an exercise in research, analysis, and critical thinking.

As the global security environment grows increasingly complex, United States (US) national defense strategies need to evolve beyond traditional threat frameworks. While Russia (RU), China (CN), Iran (IR), and North Korea (NK) - the "Big Four" - remain primary national security concerns, they don't represent the full spectrum of emerging kinetic threats the US may face over the next two decades. A range of other state and non-state threat actors are developing the capabilities and intent to challenge US interests militarily, often in unexpected theaters or through less conventional means. Additionally, evolving political dynamics, specifically within Western alliances, raise important questions about future alliance cohesion and possible conflict scenarios. This analysis differs from my typical threat summary and aims to anticipate where the next significant kinetic threats may arise, in hopes of helping defense planners, policymakers, and allied stakeholders think proactively about where to invest their attention, resources, and strategy over the 2025-2045 horizon.

When assessing future military threats to the US, analysts often focus their attention on the Big Four adversaries due to their prominent capabilities and hostile postures. The next 20 years, however, could also see other countries and non-state actors posing significant kinetic threats to the US or her allies. This report provides a forward-looking analysis of these potential threats, examining both state and non-state threat actors. The report will emphasize capability and intent to engage in or support military conflict against the US or allies, with a special emphasis on Western European nations and any internal political developments, alliance fragmentation, or rearmament trends that could shift today's partners into tomorrow's potential adversaries. Each actor or category of actors is discussed with their rationale (why they are considered), an estimate risk level, and plausible scenarios for conflict, highlighting less-obvious dangers that could emerge by 2045, based on credible geopolitical and defense analysis.

State-Based Threat Actors (Outside the "Big Four")

Pakistan - Nuclear Armed State with Internal Extremism

Rationale: Pakistan possesses a significant military and has a history of both cooperation and conflict with US interests. It's been a US ally in counterterrorism, yet elements of Pakistan's security apparatus have supported militant groups that undermine US goals. Notably, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is known to have supported the Afghan Taliban even as the US fought them, contributing to the Taliban's eventual victory over the US-backed Kabul government in 2021. It's this duplicity that bred deep distrust in Washington. Pakistan's internal stability is under constant strain from Islamist extremism, economic volatility, and fragile democratic institutions. US officials have long worried that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal could end up in extremist hands during a crisis. Washington has developed contingency plans to secure or seize Pakistan's nuclear weapons if such a scenario appeared imminent - highlighting the seriousness with which the US views this risk.

Risk Level: Moderate. A deliberate state-level Pakistani attack on the US is unlikely. The combination of nuclear capability, state-sponsored militant networks, and internal instability, however, creates a volatile mixture that could trigger an indirect or unintentional kinetic confrontation: Pakistan could be the flashpoint for a regional war (ie, another India-Pakistan conflict) or a source of nuclear proliferation and terrorism.

Possible Scenarios:

• Internal collapse and nuclear crisis:
  Political unrest, extremist takeover, or an economic collapse could create conditions in which Pakistani nuclear weapons are at risk of falling into the hands of jihadist actors. The US launches a covert or overt military operation to secure these weapons, prompting an armed resistance from Pakistani military factions or militant groups.
• Militant provocation of war:
  A Pakistani-based terrorist group, like Lashkar-e-Taiba or Jaish-e-Mohammed, carries out a mass-casualty attack in India or on US personnel abroad. This could trigger and Indo-Pakistani conflict with potential US involvement - either in support of India, in defense of the US, or to prevent nuclear escalation.
• Proxy conflict in Afghanistan:
  ISIS-K or other extremist groups could exploit border regions between Pakistan and Taliban-controlled Afghanistan to stage attacks. If Pakistan covertly supports such groups while the US engages them, kinetic confrontation could result, especially if the US strikes targets on Pakistani soil without consent.

Turkey - NATO Ally on a Divergent Path

Rationale: Turkey currently occupies a unique position as a longtime NATO member that in more recent years has pursued an increasingly independent and assertive foreign policy. Under President Erdogan, Turkey has shifted toward authoritarianism at home and taken actions that often conflict with US interests. Examples include:

• Military incursions into northern Syria to target Kurdish forces allied with the US.
• The controversial purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system, which undermined NATO interoperability.
• Heightened tensions with fellow NATO members like Greece over Aegean airspace, maritime boundaries, and military presence on islands.

According to the Council on Foreign Relations and other strategic analysis, Turkey and the US "no longer share overarching threats or interests that bind them together". Some even describe the relationship as having shifted from ambivalent partnership to open antagonism in some spaces. Despite being a NATO ally, Turkey's trajectory introduces significant strategic uncertainty for the alliance.

Turkey's military is large, battle-tested, and capable, giving it significant operational autonomy in regional conflicts. If Turkish strategic interests increasingly diverge from NATO's or align with adversarial powers like Russia or Iran, the risk of friction or even kinetic conflicts with the US or allied nations rises considerably.

Risk Level: Moderate. Direct hostilities between the US and Turkey are not wanted by either side and remain unlikely under typical conditions. The accumulation of friction points, combined with Turkey's growing defense ties with non-NATO actors and active engagements in multiple regional conflicts, increases the probability of an accidental or indirect clash. The long-term risk is that Turkey could gradually shift from ally to quasi-adversary.

Possible Scenarios:

• Clash in the Eastern Mediterranean:
  A maritime dispute in the Aegean or Eastern Mediterranean leads to a military incident between Turkey and Greece. Rival military vehicles or weapon systems could collide or exchange fire near contested waters. This would put NATO's credibility at stake. If Turkey is to be perceived as the aggressor, the US may be compelled to support Greece militarily or diplomatically, especially under an administration that favors alliance solidarity. The potential for miscalculation is higher.
• Syria entanglement:
  Turkey launches a major offensive into Syria to combat Kurdish groups like the YPG, which the former considers terrorists but which the US has partnered with against ISIS. If embedded US forces come under Turkish fire, this could result in direct combat. A 2019 Turkish operation already forced US troops to retreat from some positions in Syria. A future offensive scenario may not leave that option open.
• NATO split or departure:
  In a future scenario where Turkey becomes more autocratic or strategically aligned with RU, it could block NATO consensus on key issues or even formally withdraw from the alliance. In a crisis, Turkey could deny US forces access to critical bases such as Incirlik or cooperate militarily with US adversaries. If US and Turkish forces end up operating in the same theater but backing opposing factions, direct conflict could result.

Venezuela - Anti-US Regime and Regional Destabilizer

Rationale: Venezuela, under Nicola Maduro's regime, has aligned itself with several US adversaries and actively undermined regional stability. Although currently bogged down in economic collapse and political repression, Venezuela remains a security concerns for multiple reasons:

• It has developed strategic ties with IR, RU, and CN, including military cooperation and arms transfers.
• It has reportedly hosted operatives from Hezbollah and other IR-linked proxy groups.
• It maintains one of Latin America's largest militaries and has stockpiled modern RU and CN weaponry, including air defenses and armored vehicles.
• Its government regularly makes aggressive claims on neighboring territory, notably the oil-rich Essequibo region of Guyana.

Caracas' close ties with IR are particularly worrisome. Analysts have warned about the growing influence of Tehran-Hezbollah-Caracas axis. IR tankers and advisors have helped Venezuela skirt sanctions, while Hezbollah is alleged to use Venezuela for fundraising and logistics. These developments, in addition to Maduro's hostility toward the US, raise the possibility that Venezuela could become a platform for proxy operations or regional confrontation.

Risk Level: Low to Moderate. While Venezuela lacks the capability to directly threaten the US mainland, it could indirectly provoke kinetic conflict by destabilizing the region or enabling terrorism. If its aggression toward neighbors or support for non-state actors escalates, the US could be drawn into direct conflict.

Possible Scenarios:

• Border war with Guyana:
  Venezuela escalates its territorial claim over the Essequibo region, where US-based ExxonMobil is developing significant oil infrastructure. In a worse-case scenario, the Venezuelan military crosses into Guyanese territory or targets offshore drilling platforms. Given the US' economic and diplomatic support for Guyana, a kinetic response is plausible.
• Terror network hub:
  If Venezuela indeed allows Hezbollah or other US-designated terrorist groups to use its territory for fundraising, training, or even plotting attacks, it may eventually provoke US military action. A realistic trigger: a Hezbollah cell in Venezuela plots an attack on a US embassy in the region or on Miami-based exile groups. The US, viewing Caracas as a state-sponsor of terrorism, could conduct strikes on training camps or sanction a naval blockade to stop Iranian weapons shipments. Actions like this could be met by Venezuelan force; its air defenses, for instance, firing on US aircraft.
• Internal meltdown and intervention:
  Venezuela's ongoing economic collapse worsens, leading to mass refugee outflows and violent factional fighting. If instability spills into Colombia or the Caribbean, a coalition including the US and Colombia might intervene militarily to stabilize parts of Venezuela or to secure its oil facilities. US troops could find themselves in combat against Venezuelan military units or militias in an urban warfare setting. In this scenario, Cuba might also get involved, at least in an advisory capacity, further complicating the conflict.

Syria - Proxy Battleground with Persistent Threats

Rationale: Although Syria lacks the conventional military might it once had, it still remains a dangerous and unstable node within a larger regional power struggle. The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 after opposition forces captured Damascus and Bashar al-Assad fled to Russia has left the country fractured. In place of a centralized government, several distinct factions now vie for control, including opposition militias, Kurdish groups, remnants of ISIS, and Iranian-backed forces. US special operations personnel remain active in the region, particularly in eastern Syria, where the risk of kinetic conflict is still high.

The vacuum left by Assad's departure has been exploited by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah, both of which are expanding their footprint in the country. IR views Syria as an important corridor for moving weapons and personnel to southern Lebanon, increasing tensions with Israel and heightening the chances of strikes and counterstrikes. Syrian air defenses have engaged Israeli aircraft and remain a latent threat to US operations. All the while, RU retains a military presence, further complication deconfliction efforts.

Risk Level: Moderate to High. While Syria is no longer a unified state capable of initiating a large-scale conflict, the power vacuum has created a dynamic and fragmented battlespace full of high-risk actors. The continued US military presence in eastern Syria creates persistent potential for kinetic escalation, whether through direct attacks, miscalculation, or regional spillover.

Possible Scenarios:

• Militia attacks on US bases:
  IR-backed groups operating in the above-mentioned power vacuum continue launching rockets and drones aimed at US forces in eastern Syria. A successful strike causing significant damage or casualties triggers a large-scale US retaliatory campaign targeting militia infrastructure and command nodes.
• Israeli-Iranian war spillover:
  Should existing hostilities between Israel and Iran escalate, Syrian territory would likely serve as a launch platform for attacks against Israel as it is now dominated by pro-Iranian factions. The US could be drawn into the conflict to defend Israeli assets or disrupt Iranian logistical networks.
• Russian or Turkish miscalculations:
  RU maintains bases and airspace rights in western Syria, while Turkey continues operations against Kurdish factions in the north. A mistaken strike, collision, or contested airspace maneuver involving US forces may spark an unintended military exchange, especially in a post-Assad environment lacking reliable communication channels.

North African States - Fragile Stability and Kinetic Flashpoints

Rationale: North Africa remains a region of considerable strategic importance, connecting sub-Saharan Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. Even though most North African governments are not hostile to the US, several states face internal instability, radicalization risks, and power influence that could lead to kinetic conflict involving US forces or strategic interests.

Libya continues to be divided between rival government backed by competing external actors (e.g., RU, Turkey, Egypt, and the UAE). Armed groups maintain control of large swaths of territory, and recent reports indicate that Wagner Group remnants and other RU-aligned mercenaries remain operational in the east. Weapons trafficking, smuggling, and jihadist activity persist across Libya's borders.

Egypt, a longtime US military partner, is facing deepening authoritarianism and economic strain. While currently aligned with US interests, there are some concerns about a future political shift or social unrest that could threaten stability. Additionally, Egypt's proximity to Gaza, Israel, and Sudan places it in a volatile regional corridor.

Algeria, albeit more stable, has aligned itself more closely with RU in recent years, expanding military cooperation and defense purchases. Its regional rivalry with Morocco over the Western Sahara and its potential to exploit instability in neighboring Sahel countries make Algeria a wildcard.

Risk Level: Low to Moderate. Most North African countries are unlikely to initiate kinetic conflict with the US, but the potential for the US to be drawn into regional instability, especially under a humanitarian pretext or counterterrorism mandate, is significant.

Possible Scenarios:

• Counterterrorism in Libya:
  A resurgent ISIS cell launches a high-profile attack on US or European targets in North Africa. The US responds with special operations raids or airstrikes in Libya, potentially clashing with RU- or Turkish-aligned militias operating in the same space.
• Egyptian collapse or coup:
  Economic meltdown or widespread protests trigger a military coup or civil war in Egypt. The US, fearing disruption to the Suez Canal traffic, threats to Israel, or attacks on US personnel, considers intervention or support for stabilization operations.
  
• Western Sahara escalation:
  Algeria and Morocco engage in a proxy conflict over Western Sahara. While not likely to escalate into full-scale war, US diplomatic and security interests in the region could result in advisory or ISR support operations that escalate in contested airspace.

Non-State Actors

Salafi-Jihadist Terror Networks (e.g., ISIS, Al-Qaeda, JNIM)

Rationale: Salafi-jihadist networks, despite the weakening of centralized leadership, remain a persistent and adaptable threat to US interests globally. Such groups are decentralized, ideologically motivated, and capable of exploiting failed states or ungoverned regions to launch attacks or destabilize friendly regimes.

ISIS, while territorially defeated in Syria and Iraq, still maintains operational branches such as ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K) in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as affiliates in the Sahel, Somalia, and Southeast Asia. Al-Qaeda's franchises continue to plot external attacks and exploit fragile states. US and allied intelligence services repeatedly warned that these groups seek to stage mass-casualty events and inspire homegrown terrorism.

Risk Level: Moderate to High. While yes, these groups lack the conventional capability to challenge the US militarily, their potential to kill US personnel, destabilize allies, or provoke conflict through terrorism is considerable. In areas where US troops operate near jihadist strongholds, the risk of ambushes or base attacks remains elevated.

Possible Scenarios:

• ISIS-K external operations:
  A cell operating our of Afghanistan or Pakistan successfully executes an attack on US diplomatic or commercial targets in the Middle East or Europe. The US responds with strikes inside Taliban-controlled areas, creating tension with local authorities and risking escalation with Pakistan.
• Sahel collapse:
  Jihadist groups overrun military bases or entire towns in Mali, Burkina Faso, or Niger. France withdraws from the region, and the US is forced to decide if she should send troops back in under a counterterrorism umbrella. These missions naturally carry kinetic risks, especially with local militaries weakened by coups and corruption.
• High-profile hostage scenario:
  US or allied citizens are taken hostage by a jihadist group in a failed state. A rescue operation is launched, resulting in a conflict with militants and, possibly, confrontation with a regional power backing the terrorist group indirectly (e.g., Yemen or Libya).

Iranian Proxies (Hezbollah, Houthis, Iraqi Militias)

Rationale: Iran's strategic doctrine relies heavily on asymmetric warfare and the use or proxy militias to advance its interests while maintaining plausible deniability. These groups are typically well-armed, ideologically aligned with Iran's goals, and capable of executing complex military operations. They have often targeted US and allied personnel, infrastructure, and shipping routes across the Middle East.

Hezbollah possesses an arsenal rivaling that of many national entities, including drones, precision-guided munitions, and surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). The group is deeply embedded in Lebanese politics but operates with operational independence, especially when executing attacks against Israel. It has also trained militias in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.

The Houthis in Yemen have evolved from an insurgent movement into a heavily armed force capable of striking US Navy vessels, Saudi oil infrastructure, and Red Sea shipping routes. They have increasingly demonstrated long-range missile and drone capabilities, often with suspected Iranian support.

Iraqi militias aligned with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), many of which maintain loyalty to the IRGC-QF, regularly target US forces in Iraq and Syria. All of these groups operate under the radar, blending in to state security structures while conducting attacks through deniable means.

Risk Level: High. Such groups do not seek open war with the US but are consistently willing to engage in kinetic activity that could trigger escalation.

Possible Scenarios:

• Red Sea escalation:
  The Houthis continue targeting international shipping in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb Strait. After a successful missile strike on a US Navy destroyer or commercial tanker, the US launches a broader military campaign to neutralize Houthi missile and drone stockpiles in northern Yemen, ushering in counterstrikes and threatening escalation with Iran.
• Iraqi base attacks:
  Iranian-backed militias in Iraq carry out a coordinated drone and rocket assault on a US base, killing American personnel. The US responds with strikes inside Iraq, prompting Iraq's government to demand withdraw and triggering a broader political and military crisis.
• Hezbollah mobilization:
  In the event of war between Israel and Hamas or Iran, Hezbollah opens a second front on Israel's northern border using its long-range missile arsenal. The US responds with air defense assets, logistics support, or possibly even strikes on Hezbollah command nodes.

Transnational Criminal Organizations (e.g., Mexican Cartels)

Rationale: Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are not typically viewed through a kinetic military threat lens, however, their operational capabilities have evolved dramatically. These organizations now possess military-grade weapons, armored vehicles, unmanned aerial systems (UAS), and command structures resembling insurgent forces. Some cartels have even started fielding paramilitary units that engage in direct conflict with Mexican security forces.

Groups like the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) and Sinaloa Cartel have repeatedly challenged the Mexican government's authority, assassinated public officials, and operated sophisticated cross-border smuggling activities. They also operate clandestine weapons manufacturing, use encrypted communications, and employ former military personnel. The cartels' growing control of territory near the US border raises concerns about spillover violence, especially if US law enforcement or military assets are directly targeted.

In a significant policy shift, President Donald Trump officially designated major Mexican cartels as Foreign terrorist Organizations (FTOs) in early 2025. This move allows the US government expanded legal authority to apply counterterrorism frameworks, including kinetic military options, against these groups. While the designation remains politically controversial, it highlights a growing consensus that TCOs are evolving beyond organized crime and increasingly resemble paramilitary threats.

Risk Level: Moderate. Cartels are unlikely to intentionally provoke a military conflict with the US. Their growing militarization, proximity to US borders, and involvement in cross-border violence make kinetic engagement an increasing possibility.

Possible Scenarios:

• Cross-Border incursion or retaliation:
  A high-profile attack or kidnapping of US citizens in northern Mexico prompts a limited US military raid or drone strike against a cartel compound. The operation results in firefights with cartel gunmen and political backlash from Mexico.
• Insurgent-style uprising:
  A major Mexican state sees total collapse of local governance due to cartel dominance. Cartels deploy armored vehicles and man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) to challenge the Mexican military. In coordination with Mexican authorities, the US sends special operations advisors or air assets to assist.
• Cartel-linked terror plot:
  A cartel collaborates with a jihadist network or rogue state actor to smuggle explosive devices or weapons into the US. If a successful attack is traced back to a cartel logistics network, political pressure could motivate a sustained kinetic campaign targeting cartel leadership and infrastructure inside Mexico.

Organized References

Pakistan – Nuclear Instability Risks
Arms Control Association. (2023, August). Arms control and proliferation profile: Pakistan. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/pakistanprofile

Kalb, M. (2021, September 28). The agonizing problem of Pakistan’s nukes. Brookings Institution. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-agonizing-problem-of-pakistans-nukes/

Council on Foreign Relations. (2025, March 26). Instability in Pakistan. Global Conflict Tracker. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/instability-pakistan

Turkey – NATO Divergence
Robinson, K. (2023, July 11). Turkey’s growing foreign policy ambitions. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/turkeys-growing-foreign-policy-ambitions

Outzen, R. (2024, October 30). Bring US-Turkish relations in from the cold. Brookings Institution. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/bring-us-turkish-relations-in-from-the-cold/

Venezuela – Iran Links and Destabilization Risk
Pelcastre, J. (2024, April 15). Venezuela consolidates its position as Iran’s gateway to Latin America. Diálogo Américas. https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/venezuela-consolidates-its-position-as-irans-gateway-to-latin-america/

Rouvinski, V. (2023). Russia, Iran, and Venezuela: Strange bedfellows or strategic partners? In Hobbs, C. & Moran, R. (Eds.), Great Power Competition in the Southern Hemisphere (pp. 85–97). Wilson Center. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/russia-iran-and-venezuela-strange-bedfellows-or-strategic-partners

Hezbollah – Arsenal and Proxy Threat
Robinson, K. (2024, November 15). What is Hezbollah? Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah

Bassam, L., & Perry, T. (2024, September 25). Hezbollah’s tunnels and flexible command weather Israel’s deadly blows. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollahs-tunnels-flexible-command-weather-israels-deadly-blows-2024-09-25/

ISIS-K – Transnational Terror Threat
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). (2025). Annual threat assessment of the U.S. intelligence community. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2025-Unclassified-Report.pdf

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). (2023, October 30). Quarterly report to Congress: October 2023. https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2023-10-30qr.pdf

Iranian Proxy Militias
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). (2023). Annual threat assessment of the U.S. intelligence community. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2023-Unclassified-Report.pdf

Byman, D. (2023). Iran’s playbook: The strategy and statecraft of proxy warfare. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA300-5.html

North African Fragility & Failed States
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI). (2024, May 16). Libya’s stable instability. https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/libyas-stable-instability-139863

National Intelligence Council. (2021). Global trends 2040: A more contested world. https://www.dni.gov/files/images/globalTrends/GT2040/GlobalTrends_2040.pdf

Mexican Cartels – Paramilitarization
Arsenault, C. (2011, October 17). ‘Paramilitaries’ rise from Mexico’s cartels. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/10/17/paramilitaries-rise-from-mexicos-cartels

Landay, J., Ali, I., & Slattery, G. (2023, September 22). Republican-proposed attacks on Mexican cartels could lead to American casualties. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/republican-proposed-attacks-mexican-cartels-could-lead-american-casualties-2023-09-22/

U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). (2024, October). Homeland threat assessment 2025. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-10/24_0930_ia_24-320-ia-publication-2025-hta-final-30sep24-508.pdf

Alliance Fragmentation and Strategic Fractures
Bazin, A. (2018). An alliance divided? Five factors that could fracture NATO. Military Review, 98(1), 89–100. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20180131_art015.pdf

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. (2023). The future of NATO: A tale of two crises. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-future-of-nato-a-tale-of-two-crises/